Following a series of anti- government events which started by the summer of 1990 when hundreds of people flooded foreign embassies in Tirana to seek political asylum, university students started a hunger strike in December 1990 which culminated with huge crowds gathering in Tirana’s main Scanderbeg Square on the 20^th of February 1991.

After hours of resistance from communist police and army officers protecting the main square of Tirana, the crowd managed to get hold of the main statue of Albania’s former dictator Enver Hoxha and bring it down, later dragging it through the central streets of Tirana.

The 20 February 1991 has ever since marked the fall of communism in what used to be dubbed as the ‘North Korea’ of Europe and one of the harshest communist dictatorships in the world which oppressed Albanians for 45 uninterrupted years.

On this special commemorative occasion, Tirana Echo would like to share a piece of history from the archives of the Washington Post covering that historic day for the small Balkan nation.

THE WASHINGTON POST ARCHIVES

VIENNA, FEB. 20  1991– A jubilant pro-democracy crowd today toppled the giant bronze statue of Communist Albania\’s founder, Enver Hoxha, that had dominated the heart of the capital, Tirana.

President Ramiz Alia, responding to protests there and in the port city of Durres, where another statue of Hoxha was torn down, announced he would form a new government. \”I have decided to take the government into my hands and create a new government and a new presidential council,\” Alia said in a nationally televised broadcast.

Alia, who succeeded Hoxha after his death in 1985, provided no details about plans for the new council, but he said he met today with opposition leaders. It was unclear whether Alia would organize a coalition government including the opposition.

Witnesses in Tirana said about 5,000 demonstrators demanding the Communist leadership\’s resignation had gathered near Hoxha\’s statue, which was surrounded by about 500 police officers.

Police initially fired warning shots and hurled smoke bombs, witnesses said. But some officers soon began embracing demonstrators and allowed them to move to the concrete base of the 30-foot statue of the former Stalinist leader. State television reported that some demonstrators scaled the statue and pulled it over with a rope.

Protesters pushed against the statue for an hour before it fell, said Ben Ruka, a journalist with the opposition Democratic Revival newspaper. He said the body of the statue was towed away by trucks to the Tirana university campus.

Two people were slightly injured by flying stone chips as the statue lurched and crashed, Ruka said, adding that crowds scrambled to pocket shards as souvenirs. {Reuter news agency reported that protesters rolled the statue\’s head into a central square and urinated on it.}

Alia\’s move to revamp the government appeared to be an attempt to distance himself from the unpopular legacy of Communist rule and to use his personal appeal, even among anti-Communists, to pull the country through a period of turmoil.

He said the country was \”at a critical point,\” and he appealed for cooperation from opposition parties. \”We must all of us work to get out of this situation,\” he said, adding that change was \”necessary for peace and democracy.\”

Crowds had gathered in Tirana to stage a general strike and to join about 700 students and faculty in a hunger strike at Enver Hoxha University. The protesters called for improved living and studying conditions and demanded that Hoxha\’s name be dropped from the university.

After today\’s protest, Premier Adil Carcani announced that he would bow to a key demand by renaming the university. The state news agency ATA reported that the hunger strikers ended their fast after hearing Carcani\’s statement.

In December, Alia scrapped 45 years of Stalinist rule, promised economic reform and scheduled free multi-party elections March 31. For many Albanians, however, the pace of economic and political change has appeared too slow after decades of repression and growing poverty.

Radio Tirana reporter Ilir Ikonomi, speaking by phone from Tirana, said as many as 60,000 people had gathered at the campus. Other estimates ranged from 20,000 to 100,000. \”Some were burning works of Enver Hoxha,\” Ikonomi said, adding that the crowd chanted, \”Hoxha, Hitler\” and \”Ramiz, you don\’t know what hunger is.\”

A journalist with the official media, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said that \”in most parts of Tirana, work is paralyzed\” with people obeying a strike called by newly established, independent trade unions. Despite a government decree requiring 15 days\’ notice before strikes take place, the unions gave just one day\’s notice.

The university protest began 15 days ago with a boycott of classes. While the government previously agreed to most of the students\’ demands, it had said removing Hoxha\’s name could only be considered by the legislature after elections. Students also have called for the resignations of Justice Minister Enver Halili, Foreign Minister Reis Malile and Interior Minister Hekuran Isai.

Archive Source: The Washington Post

Copyright @2019 TiranaEcho.com  |  All Rights Reserved

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Only three countries from the region score above the global average of 43. Georgia leads the region with just 58 points on the CPI, followed by Montenegro (45) and Belarus (44).

At the very bottom, Turkmenistan earns the lowest score in the region (20), followed by Uzbekistan (23) and Tajikistan (25).

Unsurprisingly, given its average score of 35, Eastern Europe and Central Asia is the second lowest scoring region in the index, ahead of Sub-Saharan Africa which has an average score of 32.

With this dismal reality in mind, a disturbing trend is emerging. Highly corrupt countries that score poorly on the CPI also tend to have fragile democratic institutions and their citizens have weaker political and civil rights.   

CORRUPTION AND THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRACY

From Russia to Azerbaijan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan, many democratic institutions and norms across the region are currently under threat – often from authoritarian rule. Governments throughout Eastern Europe and Central Asia are failing to preserve the checks and balances that are foundational to democracy and instrumental in controlling corruption.

Corruption thrives where weak democratic practices exist. Combined with a lack of political will to combat corruption in the public sector, countries across the region are undermining the political rights of their citizens. As a result, people are unable to speak out, demonstrate or associate with organisations or activist groups – at least not without fear of consequences. At the same time, corruption locks these countries in a vicious cycle where the ruling politicians have no real incentive to allow for democratisation and strengthening of independent institutions.

In many post-Soviet countries, checks and balances do not exist that would ordinarily keep powerful private individuals and groups from exerting exceptional influence over government decisions. In these settings, illicit lobbying practices take place and conflicts of interest go undisclosed.

Among European Union (EU) candidate and potential candidate countries, or those countries currently in accession negotiations with the EU, four out of seven have seen minor drops in their CPI scores since last year. Despite firm EU conditions on curbing corruption and ensuring institutions are free of political influence, many governments across the region fail to show true commitment to democracy and the rule of law.

Specifically, many of these countries fail to disclose sufficient information about electoral campaigns and political party finances. In addition, these countries act against civil society organisations, investigative journalists and political opponents.

One of the biggest impediments to fighting corruption in Eastern Europe and Central Asia is state capture, where powerful individuals or groups seize control of national decision-making and use corrupt means to circumvent justice.

Without sufficient checks and balances in countries throughout the region, institutions suffer and undemocratic practices persist. While governments claim to prioritise combating political corruption, in reality, they fail to take concrete steps to do so. This erodes citizens’ trust in their own government as well as in international bodies and agreements, and contributes to higher rates of corruption.

IMPROVERS

Unfortunately, given the region’s low-scoring trends, there are very few countries making any real progress in the fight against corruption.

While EU-candidate Albania increased by five points in the last five years, moving from 31 in 2013 to 36 in 2018, it dropped two points since last year. This may be due to a political stalemate that blocked several anti-corruption reforms from moving forward. With a new judicial vetting process and anti-corruption institutional framework almost complete, it remains to be seen whether Albania will improve its score in the future.

DECLINERS

This year, Azerbaijan (scoring 25), Russia (28), Kazakhstan (31), Kosovo (37), Serbia (39) and Montenegro (45) are among the countries which have either declined in their CPI score or continue to stagnate.

Azerbaijan drastically dropped six points on the CPI, moving from 31 in 2017 to 25 in 2018. This decline follows a continued crackdown on civil society and independent journalists. Over the last couple of years, the Azerbaijani government has made it immensely difficult for civil society organisations, including our chapter Transparency International Azerbaijan, to accept international funding that would allow them to continue to operate. By tightening access to funds, the government is curbing citizens’ ability to organise and speak out.

In addition, in September 2017, the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) published an investigation that revealed a US$2.9 billion money laundering operation and slush fund run by Azerbaijan’s ruling elite. The Azerbaijani Laundromat operation used the siphoned funds to promote the country’s image abroad and distract from human rights violations committed under its authoritarian regime, according to the report.

With a score of 28, Russia dropped one point since 2017, an unsurprising decline given weak political and civil rights as well as an ineffective system of checks and balances. This low score reflects a lack of trust among experts and businesspeople in the ability of the government to yield sustainable anti-corruption action.

Cronyism remains a cornerstone of Russian social and political processes. Independent media are rare, as are independent NGOs, which are often replaced with organisations created and financed by the government. In addition, the judicial system is often biased, with courts administering large fines on independent actors to keep them in line with the government’s agenda.

For example, in 2018, Vladimir Litvinenko, rector of St. Petersburg Mining University and previous academic supervisor of President Vladimir Putin, sued our chapter, Transparency International Russia (TI-Russia), for publishing an investigation into the misuse of public funds.

The court ruled in favour of Mr. Litvinenko, concluding that while TI-Russia’s investigation presented factual evidence, it also damaged Mr. Litvinenko’s reputation by exposing his misuse of public funds, and for that, the chapter was fined one million roubles. 

TI-Russia successfully raised one million roubles in less than a week to pay the fine imposed by the court, largely thanks to hundreds of online donations from Russian citizens.

Signatures on international agreements such as the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption and its monitoring body, the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO), which are both part of the Council of Europe, along with commitments from the 2016 Anti-Corruption Summit, seem to create an illusion of progress in Russia without delivering real results. The Civil Law Convention on Corruption, which allows citizens and private sector actors to seek redress for corruption cases, remains a non-priority for Russia, along with implementing lobbying regulations and whistleblower protections.

With a score of 39, Serbia dropped two points since last year, a trend that may persist if the government continues to undermine those bodies and institutions that are responsible for maintaining the rule of law. In 2018, despite opposition from NGOs, professional associations and others, the government has pushed for increased influence over the judiciary.

Similarly, the government is working to reduce public access to information by exempting state-owned enterprises from disclosing information. In addition, despite government claims of supporting free media, journalist associations are having difficulty engaging in the development of Serbia’s new media strategy.

Our chapter, Transparency Serbia, is a strong advocate for anti-corruption measures and independent oversight bodies. To advance these efforts, the chapter conducts anti-corruption research, monitors the implementation of EU accession requirements and participates in NGO coalitions aimed at improving democratic and anti-corruption frameworks.

With a score of 37, Kosovo dropped two points on the CPI since 2017. Some of the biggest anti-corruption challenges in Kosovo include insufficient transparency, weak institutions and rule of law and insufficient space for citizen engagement. To address these issues, our chapter, Kosova Democratic Institute, monitors public institutions, advocates for transparency of political party financing and runs various campaigns to engage citizens in national decision-making.

With a score of 45, Montenegro dropped one point since last year. Despite its advancement in EU integration, the country has yet to significantly improve its rule of law. Concerns around political party financing and a lack of financial disclosure cast a shadow on electoral results.

In an environment dominated by the same ruling elite for over two decades, the effects of state capture are evident in Montenegro. Yet despite these challenges, our chapter, MANS, remains a strong advocate for strengthening the rule of law and improving free access to information.

COUNTRIES TO WATCH

Turkey, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Ukraine, Macedonia and Armenia are all the countries to watch over the next few years. Categorised by their challenging political landscapes, only Armenia bucks the trend with a positive change in government.

Despite an unchanged CPI score of 36, recent political developments in Bosnia and Herzegovina are worrying. Following elections in October, which raised concerns of fraud and poor administration, the regional public prosecutor in the city of Banja Luka dismissed calls for an investigation into politician, Milorad Dodik, for exercising illegal pressure against voters during his campaign.

More recently, authorities in Banja Luka attacked peaceful protesters, arrested and detained opposition leaders and activists, and banned public gatherings. This is a clear example of alleged corruption in an election campaign leading to a crackdown on democratic institutions and participation. Transparency International Bosnia and Herzegovina is working to advance transparency and accountability of prosecution, monitor financing of electoral campaigns and assist citizens in reporting corruption.

With a score of 58, Georgia increased by two points since last year, however the country now faces democratic backsliding, making it both vulnerable to high-level corruption and a country to watch moving forward.

This downturn is due to a lack of accountability of law enforcement, corruption and political interference in the judiciary, state capture and government-sponsored attacks on independent civil society, among other issues. Despite an urgent need to investigate cases of corruption and misconduct in the government, Georgia has failed to establish independent agencies to take on this mandate.

Impunity contributes to public distrust. According to a recent poll conducted by our chapter, Transparency International Georgia, 36 per cent of citizens believe that public officials abuse their power for personal gain. This is up from only 12 per cent in 2013.

Progress in anti-corruption will continue to stall and reverse if the Georgian government does not take immediate steps to ensure the independence of institutions, including the judiciary, and support civil society, which enhances political engagement and public oversight.

Although Ukraine improved its CPI score by two points, moving from 30 in 2017 to 32 in 2018, the enforcement of anti-corruption reforms launched in 2014 remains incomplete, leaving Ukraine well below the average global score of 43.

Four years since anti-corruption legal and institutional frameworks were introduced, progress is too slow. The newly established anti-corruption bodies have not succeeded in bringing to account any corrupt high-level official, even though a number of proceedings have been initiated.

Public disillusionment with the Ukrainian government is growing steadily. Citizens are disenchanted with the results of the reforms and have little confidence in the ability of the government to improve the situation. Yet, despite this distrust, an active and independent civil society could help control corruption and improve confidence in government institutions. Although it often takes years for anti-corruption laws to yield results, and Ukraine must redouble its efforts to ensure progress.

Additionally, as pressure from the international community and civil society continues to grow, so does the resistance of those with vested interests in power. As a result, Ukraine is an important country to watch in the years to come.

RECOMMENDATIONS

While many countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia have well-designed laws, which are essential for anti-corruption efforts, these laws are not enough to truly combat corruption in the region. Corruption takes place when there is opportunity and impunity. To this end, we call on governments to:

• provide free space for civil society to operate, including protecting free speech and the right to organise and protest
• engage citizens in monitoring government spending
• reform the judicial system and improve integrity and accountability across government institutions
• provide free access to information and improve enforcement mechanisms as a precondition for successful anti-corruption efforts.

Source: Transparency International
Image: Copyright, Getty Images
For any press enquiries please contact press@transparency.org

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It was a common scene in Tirana, the eastern Mediterranean capital of Albania — hundreds of people assembling in Skanderbeg Square, men and women dressed in olive-green partisan uniforms emblazoned with red Soviet stars as if they’d just come from a war. Or were on their way to one.

At just such gathering, graying dictator Enver Hoxha announced an aggressive military policy that would impact the lives of every man, woman and child in the tiny Balkan country. The leader who had ruled Albania with an iron fist since 1944 was about to prepare his homeland to defend itself against invasion on all fronts with a strange strategy — bunkerization.

Starting in 1967, construction of round-topped concrete bunkers continued unabated for the next 20 years until the mushroomlike strongholds sprouted along beaches and borders, atop hills and mountains and throughout fields and forests. Though the exact number of gray pods is unknown — estimates range from 500,000 to nearly 750,000 — the bunkers stand as monuments to the years that Albanians lived in complete isolation from the rest of the world.

There were two main reasons Hoxha decided bunkerization was necessary, according to Tritan Shehu, Albania’s former minister of foreign affairs. Construction of the bunkers was connected intrinsically with the regime’s paranoia about the intentions of the Soviet bloc and its equally deep-seated suspicions of the non-Communist world. “So it was a reaction that expressed the uncertainty that a criminal has when growing up in a civil environment,” Shehu says.

Hoxha was a devout Stalinist, an isolationist and an atheist. The state was the religion, and labor was often considered worship. Githmone gotti — “always ready” — was a common phrase in Hoxha’s Albania. The construction program added to that “psychology of fear” among the population, says Shehu. It became “necessary for Albanians to look like enemies to all who lived abroad, as well as anyone who did not like the domestic regime.”

The regime’s military defensive strategy was guerrilla warfare designed to defeat a more powerful invading force. Large bunkers squatted on hilltops with smaller bunkers radiating outward and connected via a network of tunnels that burrowed through the Albanian countryside. “Defense lines start with the individual and collec­tive positions of machine guns, then cannons and heavier artillery,” Rrahman Parllaku, a former high-ranking Albanian army veteran of World War II and the Kosovo War, told Elian Stefa and Gyler Mytydi, authors of Concrete Mushrooms. “Within infantry positions there are also gunmen, which provide firing support for the first and the second lines of defense.”

There was a historical precedent for this military philosophy. Albania’s landscape allowed it to fight the Ottoman Empire during five centuries of occupation, as well as thwart Italian and German attempts to control the country during World War II. With hundreds of thousands of bunkers peppering the countryside, Hoxha’s Albania was prepared to defend itself from the world.

But how did Hoxha become so crippled with paranoia that he had to fortify his nation? Hoxha had not made many friends in his time as leader. The Soviet Union parted ways with Albania after it sided with China during the Sino-Soviet rift. Conflict still simmered between Albania and Greece, its neighbor to the south. What was then Yugoslavia flanked it to the north and east, and relations were strained between Yugoslavian strongman Josip Broz Tito and Hoxha, who accused Tito of persecuting Yugoslavia’s Kosovar Albanian minority.

Despite the tensions of the era, war never came during Hoxha’s regime, which ended with the leader’s death, in 1985. The bunkers were never used as designed.

Thirteen years later, though, they finally saw action. Yugoslavia had broken in 1989, and its rump republics, Montenegro and Serbia, battled the Kosovo Liberation Army in 1998–99. The KLA used the bunkers as defensive positions along Albania’s border with Kosovo. The Serbian military responded by bombarding the concrete dugouts with artillery, even as refugees from the conflict sought shelter there.

Since then, most of the bunkers have fallen into disrepair, though many still crouch in mountain passes and along highways. Entrepreneurs have transformed some into hostels, shops and restaurants. “The future of the bunkers will be their destruction,” says Shehu, “and the liberation of the territories from them.” Though some people believe the nation should preserve the bunkers for their significance to Albanian history, Shehu disagrees. “The bunkers do not serve anyone,” he says. “They damage the territory and create pollution as well as bring up hideous memories of the past.”

Source: OZY.COM

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Since it\’s beginnings in 1992 the Albanian journalism market has been characterized by an excess of traders. Born after the fall of a communist regime in which only state-controlled media was permitted, with the arrival of democracy the media had the same thirst for liberty that took hold of the country\’s economy. This thirst brought with it a huge number of newspapers, then radio stations and private TV, and finally, with the spread of the internet, the more recent boom in online portals.

Today, in a country with a little less than 4 million residents, there are 30 daily newspapers with a national reach, more than 100 TV channels (including both analogue and digital), 150 radio stations and an incalculable number of web portals (it is thought that there are about 250).

Because of this mediatic obesity there is a big problem with poor quality and transparency in the sector: lacking a strong state and a fair and independent justice system, media outlets are in fact instruments of self-defence or attack for business-people pursuing their own interests, unrelated to the actual news. In fact, the owners of the Albanian media are mostly entrepreneurs or members of the construction industry, and therefore have entirely different interests at heart than the media sector.

More media than journalists
It\’s said that in Albania there are more media outlets than journalists, and this can often seem dramatically true. The phenomenon of informational obesity has led to an excess in demand for journalists, such that whoever decides to become a journalist can obtain salaried work, while not having the minimum professional requirements.

The main consequence of this phenomenon is a media that is weak on information, a product of journalists lacking professionalism and for the most part conditioned by the private interests of the owners. Apart from the necessary professional requirements, the journalists do not have union or contractual protection, which leaves them weak when facing editorial and political pressure.

The scarceness of professionalism has transformed a large part of the media, beginning with the internet portals, into copied news with no form of selection or checks. The producers of first-hand information form a very small section of employed journalists (the others simply copy and paste) and the overload of work often pushes them to publish pieces that have not been verified.

Fake news
The magnitude of inexact or totally false news in the Albanian media, published in error by genuine journalists, has made possible a growth in “fake news”, intentionally produced by decidedly less genuine journalists. Differentiating between fake, real or mistaken journalism becomes much more complicated for readers and viewers, and results in the low level of credibility that the Albanian media currently enjoys.
The obesity of the market is reflected in a publishing market which gets poorer and poorer (because of the global consumer crisis), while the number of media outlets keeps growing. The main result of this is the gradual impoverishment of the Albanian media, which is one more way to turn editors and journalists into servants of power, obviously at the expense of professionalism and credibility.

More and more
The Albanian paradox consists in the fact that the media continues to grow, despite its progressive impoverishment. This phenomenon makes clear the fact that behind these media operations are money laundering operations.

The political sphere has turned the media into servants, but in the meantime it fears the media\’s power over public opinion. This is the main reason why the state has never taken any serious action on transparency in the finances that fund newspapers, TV stations and online portals. Within the young democracy of Albania there remains the belief that freedom of the press is synonymous with an absence of rules and that a press is only truly free if it can act outside of any control.

In truth, that which all the journalists in the world require is the freedom from control of published content, while in Albania this liberty is understood as the liberty of the owners to evade fiscal obligations and to hide the origins of their finances. After the cleaning up of politics, and the efforts to clean up the judiciary, Albania awaits the day when the media too can be cleaned up.

Note: This publication has been produced within the project European Centre for Press and Media Freedom, co-funded by the European Commission. The contents of this publication are the sole responsibility of Osservatorio Balcani e Caucaso and its partners and can in no way be taken to reflect the views of the European Union. 

Osservatorio Balcani e Caucaso

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Nationalists from many Balkan nations have long accused Albanian leaders of a malicious ploy to create a \”Greater Albania\” by annexing territories from their neighbors. In turn, mainstream Albanian politicians have consistently rejected the idea as fear mongering.
However, with the EU\’s influence waning in the Balkans and old conflicts once again bubbling to the surface, leaders across the region turn to nationalist myths to harness votes. In a Politico interview less than two weeks ago, the moderate Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama said that he could not rule out a \”little union\” between Albania and Albanian-dominated Kosovo if the EU decided to take membership off the table.

The next day, Kosovo President Hashim Thaci said that \”all Albanians in the region will live in a single, united country\” if the EU closes its doors. This was the way to continue \”the integration into the European family,\” argued Thaci.
In recent days, however, he dismissed the accusations of pushing for Greater Albania and accused the EU of being naïve and buying into Serbian propaganda.
Chairman of the Albanian National Council in Serbia, Jonuz Musliu, upped the ante by saying that Albanian-populated towns in Serbia should also join with Kosovo and Albania.
\”Serbia should be grateful\” that Albanians are not asking for even more territory, he said.
Former Kosovo rebel commander Ramush Haradinaj, arriving home last week from France after being held on a Serbian arrest warrant, also talked about \”putting Serbia in its place.\”
Dream to nightmare
Belgrade responded with alarm. The government-dominated media slammed Albanian politicians, once again rehashing memories of the Kosovar war that ended 18 years ago. Serbian Prime Minister Aleksandar Vucic, a former ultra-nationalist turned pro-European, appealed for calm, but also commented that he would be \”hanged instead of a flag from a mast in Brussels\” if he made a similar statements about uniting all Serbs. Many Serbs still live in former Yugoslav republics and control their own entity in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Serbian Foreign Minister Dacic also said that the EU, the US, and Britain \”will be directly responsible\” if the Albanians push ahead with their territorial ambitions.
\”Luckily, all of this is mere dreaming. However, experience has taught us that the road leading from a dream to a nightmare is short,\” Dacic said.
EU reject changing borders
The response from the West was initially lukewarm. Last week, however, EU\’s Enlargement Commissioner Johannes Hahn spoke out against messages from Albanian leaders, saying they \”can easily backfire\” on politicians sending them.
\”I would like to take the opportunity to express my disappointment and may I say annoyance about inflammatory statements from certain leaders in the region,\” he said after meeting Dacic in Brussels. The statements implying \”changing borders are not acceptable and more than unnecessary and counterproductive.\”
Despite the outrage in Belgrade, international observers do not believe that Albanians would try to unite their territories through either violence or diplomacy. The provocative statements were most likely political posturing for this year\’s elections in Kosovo and Albania, experts told DW. Also, the threat about changing borders could serve to pressure the EU into softening its policy towards Albanian majority states.
\’Pipe dream\’ of uniting all Albanians
The talk of unification is a \”pipe dream,\” claims Frederik Wesslau, senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations think tank. However, it is very useful for both Albanian and non-Albanian politicians looking to rally their voters.
\”The bogeyman of Greater Albania is something that pops up from time to time – it\’s used by Albanian leaders, but also other leaders in the Western Balkans,\” says Wesslau, who spend several years working for the OSCE and the UN in Kosovo.
\”When it serves their specific political objectives, they can always bring that out as a dream for the Albanians or as a threat of Albanian nationalism when the Serbs and the Macedonians do it.\”
In reality, the agendas in Pristina and Tirana are not as similar as they appear at first glance, Wesslau added. Also, while the idea of uniting all Albanians holds an emotional appeal, not many voters actually support working towards this goal, he told DW.
\”There are always extremists, and you see this everywhere, but this is really a fringe phenomenon so I don\’t think we need to be afraid,\” Wesslau added.
EU umbrella still best option
The recent statements by Rama and Thaci \”shouldn\’t be taken that seriously,\” agrees Kosovo-born Erdoan Shipoli, Associate Dean of School of Public and International Affairs at Virginia International University.
Serbian Prime Minister Vucic is set to take over as president after winning the election last month
\”What the Albanian leaders hope to accomplish with these statements is get more votes from the more nationalist groups,\” he told DW. \”Many Albanian politicians are accused of being bought by the US, EU, this country or that group, so this way they want to show that they also are patriots.\”
\”Most of the Albanians, as far as I can observe, think that the best way to be united is under the EU umbrella,\” he said. \”Albanians know that it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to even choose the leader of the Great Albania, let alone making it function. The support for such an initiative is minimal,\” he added.
Even so, the talk of Greater Albania can be dangerous, according to the expert. People across the region are tired of corruption and unemployment, pro-western Albanians feel like the EU has failed to defend their interests in Macedonia and Serbia, and Kosovo citizens are angry at the EU for not letting them travel without visas. In such circumstances, it is natural for nationalist sentiment to rise, Shipoli said.
\”Right now there is no support but if the EU continues to fail the Albanians in general and Kosovo in particular, then this thought will gain more momentum and have more acceptance,\” Shipoli told DW.

Source: DW

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“God forbid” Trump wins the Republican nomination Rama told CNN’s Richard Quest.

Trump’s election would “harm a lot America and it would harm a lot the world,” predicted the 52-year-old professional artist.

Yet, Rama continues to benefit from a massive USAID program managed by his second wife (of four) and to manipulate a sympathetic U.S. embassy, even as he runs the country into the ground while fomenting chaos in neighboring Macedonia.

U.S. policy needs to make a U-Turn in Albania, assuming it’s even on the radar in Foggy Bottom.

Tirana Update

Simply put: Albania is a mess.

One of the country’s two major political powers, the center-right Democratic Party, is boycotting parliament and refuses to participate in June elections as long as the governing Socialist Party is in charge.

Meanwhile, former political dissidents surged through Tirana streets last month protesting Rama’s appointment of a new Interior Minister, Fatimir Xhafaj, who was a state prosecutor during Enver Hoxha’s malevolent, highly repressive communist regime and has a brother indicted for international drug trafficking.

Hoxha imprisoned close to 100,000 people in inhuman jails and camps; some 5,500 people were executed without trial. Among the groups he wiped out were poets, writers, intellectuals, and Christian clergy. Pope Francis beatified 38 Albanian martyrs last year.

Incredibly, 27 years after communism’s collapse, Albanian politics is still vexed by predatory clans empowered during the Stalin-, then Mao-inspired dictatorship.

Did the West fail to aid Albania on its path toward democracy?

On the contrary, Albania (some three million people living in a country the size of Connecticut) has received extensive assistance from Western institutions including the European Union and U.S. government.

USAID spent $60 million in the country’s justice sector alone, 2000 to 2015 — often coordinated with George Soros’ Open Society Foundation under the last administration. As Albanian newspaper editor Erl Murati explained earlier this year, “U.S. official interests coincide with the activity of Soros. It’s difficult to distinguish where the interest of one begins and the other ends. His interests became synonymous with American policy.”

But Western aid has mainly reinforced a dysfunctional State while enriching a nepotistic network.

As explored in the first part of this series, “Macedonia to George Soros and USAID: Go Away,” this external aid is helping the Socialist Party and its fifth column of NGO allies, employing violence as one of its noteworthy tactics, try to gain power against conservatives.

Soros’ analogous plan for Albania succeeded already in 2013, when Edi Rama’s Socialist Party defeated the Democratic Party in a victory preceded by violence.

Smoking Gun

Albania actually figured in the 2016 American election.

The WikiLeaks revelation of Clinton emails last summer included a smoking gun: Proof that billionaire tax-evader, George Soros, directed Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to take specific action, namely to intervene in Tirana on behalf of Edi Rama, leading violent street protests in January 2011.

Clinton’s staff immediately responded. Within days, a EU envoy suggested by Soros, Slovak diplomat Miroslav Lajcak (current foreign minister for the governing Direction-Social Democracy Party, he was a Communist Party member before 1990), arrived in country.

At the time, Rama was Tirana’s mayor and the country’s opposition leader, locked in a power struggle with the governing Democratic Party, which had narrowly defeated his side two years before.

Rama instigated the demonstrations — which killed four people and injured more than 150 — to protest government corruption, revealed by a video secretly recorded by the economy minister, showing how he was ordered by Deputy Prime Minister Ilir Meta to commit fraud involving public contracts and bribes. The two men belong to the same party, the Socialist Movement for Integration, DP’s coalition partner at the time.

Superficially, Edi Rama, a 6-foot 6-inch former national basketball player, turned artist, turned politician, has a cool, hipster vibe — at least, that’s what he strives to project.

Elected in 2000 to serve as mayor of the capital city (where over 800,000 people live, approximately 30 percent of the population), having spent two years as Minister of Youth, Rama made a global impression for ordering drab, Soviet-style housing blocks painted with whirls, swirls, and checkerboards from a Crayola palette.

He polished an international reputation as a post-modern innovator, giving, for example, a Ted Talk in Thessaloniki on how his urban paint projects brought down crime — although there’s no evidence they did — and bragging to the Guardian, “Once the buildings were colored, people started to get rid of the heavy fences of their shops. In the painted roads, we had 100% tax collection from the people, while tax collection was normally 4%. People accepted to pay their share for the city, because they realized that through the colors the city exists.”

Pedigree

But Rama is not new at all. In fact, he has purebred communist pedigree. He’s related through his mother to Spiro Koleka, a politburo member close to Hoxha. Documents reveal he participated with Hoxha and other Politburo members in the actual executions of anti -communist Albanians.

Edi Rama’s father, Kristaq, was a sculptor and top party member who enforced a hardline to control the arts. As one Albanian intellectual explains, “Kristaq Rama, arguably the most important sculptor of the Communist period, was part of the elite. He belonged to the Central Committee, and in the late 1980s served in the chairmanship of the Kuvendi Popullor, the Communist version of parliament. In that position, in 1987, he refused to grant a pardon to Havzi Nela, a poet sentenced to death for anti-regime propaganda.”

After communism fell, when other young political activists were joining the new Democratic Party (DP), Edi Rama lined up with old cadres in the renamed Socialist Party (SP).

“The enormous weight of Communism is still on the backs of the Albanian people,” explains Stephen Suleyman Schwartz, founder of the Center for Islamic Pluralism and a journalist who lived in the Balkans in the late 1990s.

“The Albanian Socialist Party is just the Communist Party slightly refurbished. They look at the whole country in a predatory way,” he continued. “It’s their personal refrigerator or farm, their personal property — just not backed up by a concentration camp or murder anymore.”

Meanwhile, George Soros’s Open Society Foundation of Albania, established in 1992, was cultivating a new elite, with new cadres, often children of the old guard.

It singled out young talent to be sent abroad on scholarships and given new NGOs to lead. One unstated requirement: His beneficiaries could not be religious because so many of Soros’s pet policies antagonize organized religion and traditional values. Rama ran with this crowd.

In 2010, Rama, a former Soros board member, married his fourth wife, Linda Basha Xhillari, an Open Society board member at the time — members of the same clan.

Rama’s Renaissance

Preparing for parliamentary elections in 2012, Rama made two bold moves: He engineered a photo with Barack Obama and forged an alliance with an ostensible enemy.

First, at a San Francisco fundraiser, Rama managed to snag a photo with the president.

Using the image in campaign materials was extremely effective because Albanians have been wildly pro-American, especially since the 1999 U.S.-led bombing of Serbia on behalf of Kosovo, where more than 80 percent of the population is ethnic Albanian.

But the photo was procured as a result of a crime.

Albanian-American Bilal Shehu, a New Jersey limo driver, bought two $40,000 fundraiser tickets via the Obama Victory Fund, then brought Rama to the party instead of his wife. Shehu and businessman William Argeros eventually pled guilty to laundering an illegal $80,000 donation from Tirana in order to procure the tickets.

Foreign contributions to presidential campaigns are illegal. Rama denies he was behind the scheme. Some claim the money came from drug dealers, a flourishing occupation.

Rama’s second pre-election accomplishment was joining forces with Ilir Meta, the politician who was filmed orchestrating corrupt deals in 2011, the one who sparked death and destruction in Tirana’s streets!

The alliance between Rama and Meta broke the Democratic Party’s governing coalition. (Today, Meta is speaker of the parliament.)

Together with a raft of small political entities, including minuscule Green and Communist party formations, Rama’s Alliance for a European Albania won the 2013 parliamentary elections.

“The Renaissance has won,” the egocentric leader declared, according to the BBC. Three months later, he was celebrating in New York with pal George Soros, at the octogenarian’s third wedding.

As prime minister, Rama staffed his cabinet with a blend of old guard and new elite. The old guard includes Gramoz Ruçi, the most powerful Socialist Party leader after Rama. Ruçi leads the party’s parliamentary group. In yesteryear, he was minister of interior, one of the last goons of the Communist period, chief of the secret police, in 1990.

Then there’s the new elite: men such as Albania’s foreign minister since 2013, Ditmir Bushati.

Bushati benefited from Soros support while studying at Harvard University. Then, he came home and served as the Open Society Foundation’s national coordinator to monitor progress toward European integration. From there he went to parliament and a leadership role in the Socialist Party.

Or look at Ejon Veliaj, Rama’s first minister of social welfare and youth, elected mayor of Tirana in 2015. Veliaj’s main credential for running a ministry that managed about 30 percent of the country’s budget was leadership of an NGO created by the Open Society Foundation, Mjaft! (Enough!), which spawned a slew of other NGOs to create what one blogger describes as the “Soros octopus.”

Soros’s structures groomed people like Bushati and Veliaj to lead the country, together with numerous others playing key roles in government and media.

What old and new seem to share, unfortunately, is a predatory attitude toward the state, based on economic data and public opinion. Because on dimensions such as prosperity or happiness, precious little progress has been made under Rama’s government.

Cannabis and Corruption

How is the Renaissance coming along, almost four years later? Excellent, if you’re in the drug trade. Rather badly, if you are a regular citizen.

Albania is Europe’s “main source” for cannabis, according to the 2017 Serious and Organized Crime Threat Assessment, released annually by Europol. As the best independent, English-language news site Exit.al points out, last year, the country was one producer among several (Bulgaria, Kosovo, and Serbia), but Albania appears to have displaced the others.

Cannabis production is the most important agricultural income generator, especially in mountainous regions. An Italian blog explains, “Cannabis plantations have grown up like mushrooms all over the country” in the last four years, in part because a new Vietnamese seed that grows quicker is being used.

According to Italy’s top anti-mafia prosecutor, Franko Roberti, cannabis trafficking from Albania to Italy increased 300 percent over the last year — and receipts are linked to financing for Islamic extremists, the Italians believe.

An onsite BBC report in December estimated the industry is worth approximately five billion euros a year, which is about half of the country’s GDP.

Heroin from Afghanistan also transits Albania on its way to Europe, and Albanian émigrés comprise a distribution network throughout Europe.

Although Rama points to a marked increase in marijuana confiscation by police, independent journalist Vincent W.J. van Gerven Oei assessed a new drug action plan prepared for the EU and concluded it won’t make a dent in prosecuting organized crime — an unsurprising weakness considering the new interior minister’s brother is an international cocaine dealer under indictment in Italy.

In a different case, a major drug dealer wanted by the Greek government for financing multiple cannabis shipments, Klemend Balili, can’t be touched, due to his connections with Socialist Party national and local officials, write Balkan Insight and CNN Greece based on police sources.

The drug trade is enabled by ubiquitous corruption marring Albanian law enforcement, justice, and politics.

A European Union study found an increase between 2014 and 2016 in citizens being expected to bribe officials — and more public hopelessness, as well.

Meanwhile, Albanian news sites are filled with bizarre accounts of both bad behavior by politicians and brazen disregard for attempts to make them accountable: Two SP mayors investigated for document fraud were protected by the Central Election Commission as was a SP parliamentarian who assaulted colleagues. At least, the deputy accused of murder in Belgium and of plotting to kill Speaker Meta eventually did lose parliamentary immunity.

New York University Professor Shinasi Rama, an Albanian-American (no relation to the prime minister), confirms, “Albania is totally and thoroughly corrupt, criminalized to the core, a mafia state.”

The country “is being used by international crime syndicates with terrible consequences for the State, its people, social values, and of course, for democracy, because the mafia only recognizes one form of rule, its own, and it wants to impose this rule over politicians as well,” he continued.

“Basically politicians are the capos of the mafia, jostling for power, because who ever loses the State loses a lot more than administrative authority,” said the international relations specialist, who helped found the Albanian Bee, an anti-establishment diaspora group.

No Accomplishments

It shouldn’t be a surprise that a morally challenged elite presiding over a cannabis kingdom have trouble producing positive economic indicators. World Bank data shows a sharp decrease in foreign direct investments between 2013 and 2015.

According to the Legatum Prosperity Index, Albania’s economic prosperity has fallen significantly since 2013, due to unemployment, poor infrastructure, and corruption.

Perhaps Albania’s saddest decline is on the United Nation’s Happiness Report, which ranks counties based on six dimensions of a nation’s life: income, life expectancy, social support systems, generosity, freedom, and trust.

While in the U.N.’s 2012 report (its first year with rankings), the country was ranked 63 out of 156, this year, Albania fell to 110.

Edi Rama has managed to accomplish something for himself, though: The inveterate opportunist promotes his felt-pen doodles worldwide, combining official visits to Berlin, Munich, and Hong Kong with exhibit openings in 2015 alone.[1]

He even got an Art in America review in February for his exhibit at a New York gallery of the same old doodles, plus printed wallpaper (of doodles), and some new, messy ceramics.

The critic wasn’t wowed, though, finding something “perverse” in contrasting the slight drawings to the reality of Albania as “one of Europe’s poorest countries… plagued with rampant corruption,” as though Rama’s ministerial office were merely “an aesthetic prompt.”

Dubious Projects, Empowering Soros

Reviewing various taxpayer-dollar-wasting programs promoted by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), and the U.S. embassy, especially focusing on “democracy building” over the last eight years, shows how fundamentally irrelevant they are to the country’s main problems.

Millions of dollars were spent to install high-tech digital audio recording equipment in 160 courtrooms, as part of a five-year, $9-million program implemented by Chemonics International, between 2010 and 2015. Installing trial scheduling software was another activity to improve court efficiency.

A 2013 assessment by USAID’s inspector general found a serious risk that the equipment could not be sustained since it depended on ongoing investments in server capacity and network upgrades, which Albanian public budgets could hardly afford.

In 2016, USAID/Tirana selected a new contractor, East West Management Institute (EWSI) — a training consultancy financed by George Soros in the 1990s — for a $8.8-million project, “Justice for All,” once again dedicated to improving the country’s justice system through greater transparency, accountability, accessibility bla bla bla.

At about the same time, USAID/Skopje awarded a multi-million contract to EWSI for “civic engagement” in partnership with Soros’s Open Society Foundation in Macedonia.

EWMI and Soros World maintain close connections; one of EWMI’s four directors is George Vickers, former director of international relations for the Open Society Institute.

Guess who oversees the EWSI programs in Albania and Macedonia?

Edi Rama’s ex-wife, Delina Fico, is EWMI’s director of civil society programs.

Her current partner is Bledi Çuçi, Rama’s minister of state for local issues until last month, when he was moved to a regional SP campaign position — part of a government reshuffle to satisfy EU anti-corruption demands.

Thus, USAID in the Balkans has empowered the incestuous Soros clan, embedded in the region’s socialist parties, to fly the American flag over its partisan, nepotistic activities.

U.S. Favoritism

And the U.S. government has pressured the Democratic Party to defer to the SP on important internal matters.

Last summer, Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland came to Tirana to persuade Lulzim Basha, leader of the DP (who defeated Rama in the 2011 Tirana mayoral race), to give in to the prime minister regarding judicial reform in order to inspire the EU to open membership talks with Albania. Basha’s party boycotted the vote.

Nuland’s long gone, but Embassy Tirana continues to be embroiled in Albania’s partisan politics, siding with the SP, as is well documented by Luke Coffey, director of the Heritage Foundation’s Center for Foreign Policy Studies.

Among the recent fights U.S. Ambassador Donald Lu has picked, he canceled U.S. visas for approximately 70 judges and prosecutors, including the country’s general prosecutor, all DP members, none, reportedly, from the SP.

Six U.S. senators wrote to Secretary of State Rex Tillerson on March 15 asking him to investigate funds dispersed by USAID and embassy in Albania as well as Macedonia that might benefit socialist parties and policies advanced by George Soros’s foundations.

With regard to Albania, the letter says, opposition leaders believe judicial “reforms” promoted by Embassy Tirana “are ultimately aimed to give the prime minister and left-of-center government full control over judiciary power.”

Failed Experiment

Professor Shinasi Rama considers Albania over the last 25 years to exemplify a “failed experiment.”

He explains, “Albania was a guinea pig, an experiment with new forms of organization suggested, recommended, and imposed from outside.”

In the U.S., for example, various groups are organically created and privately funded, Professor Rama pointed out, but in Albania, outsiders, whether USAID or Soros, “tried to press templates on locals,” calling it civil society.

As a result of facing “international factors which were multiple and conflicting,” the professor says, Albanian politicians “started playing a double game: Cooperate by day, undo it by night. Every law that was passed, included a lot of ‘back doors.’”

Overall, the professor concludes, “There was too much desire on the part of outsiders to change the people and the State.”

Today, Shinasi Rama sees “perpetual crisis, a country that can’t solve its own problems so it’s about to be captured by criminal forces.”

Stephen Schwartz has a similar assessment of the negative impact of outside solutions, explaining that Albanian identity has always been strongly attached to the land, yet Hoxha’s forced collectivization destroyed agriculture and the peasant’s great wealth of knowledge.

“They went from Hoxha telling them how to be an Albanian to Soros telling them, ‘You have to be a European the way I tell you how to be a European,’ imposing his mentality, which has no use for religion, culture, or education,” said Schwartz, who was a Soros grantee for work on Croatia.

Schwarz said he escaped the “prescriptive materialism” of the Soros mentality, likening it to “Communist style corruption of the intelligentsia.”

What all of the Western advisers ignored is the real treasure of the region: “I said in ’87, Balkan Muslims are a precious resource for Europe. They can create a commercial Metropole like Hong Kong. What we need is a dialogue of the religious, based on the experience of co-existence and entrepreneurship,” Schwartz said. “None of this penetrated the mind of Brussels.”

“Instead, Clinton and Soros offered exactly the same thing. Prescriptive imperialists. They think only they know what is good for you because they know! You don’t know what you need… all under the U.S. flag,” the Muslim scholar sighed, ruefully.

Source: American Spectator

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On the morning of 11 April 1985, Albania\’s communist dictator Enver Hoxha died after being struck by a massive ventricular fibrillation, leaving the country with a legacy of total isolation, fear of the outside world and huge economic uncertainties as Europe\’s poorest country.

Hoxha\’s 40 year rule over Albanians was marked by barbaric Stalinist methods of torture and elimination of opposing adversaries, prolific use of the death penalty or long prison terms for his political opponents, and evictions of their families from their homes to remote concentration areas that were strictly controlled by police or secret service \’Sigurimi\’.

Although the communist regime rebuild the country after WW2, erecting Albania\’s first railway line, eliminating adult illiteracy and leading Albania towards becoming agriculturally self-sufficient, the country came out of the brutal regime in 1991 as Europe\’s poorest nation with an immediate fall of its real GDP by 50% in 1992.

Since its painful transition from its Communist past into an open-market economy in the 90\’s, Albania has struggled to build a well functioning democracy and a solid economic model.

Although a NATO member and hoping to join the European Union in the near future, the country\’s economic development and foreign investments are hampered by high rates of corruption and organized crime activities, mainly in the drug trafficking rings in South East Europe.

As Albanians today are bitterly reminded of the death of its dictator Enver Hoxha, their country finds itself in a huge political limbo with the opposition threatening to boycott upcoming June 18 general elections.

Albania\’s opposition democrats and their smaller allies have been protesting for more than 50 days demanding Prime Minister Edi Rama\’s resignation and the creation of a technical government to guarantee free and fair elections.

Democratic Party chairman Lulzim Basha accuses the prime minister of turning a blind eye to the country\’s massive cannabis cultivation and trafficking towards Italy and Greece, claiming the narcotics dirty money would be injected to fund criminal elements for buying votes in favor of ruling Socialist Party

Rama\’s junior ally Speaker of Parliament and chair of LSI Ilir Meta has also expressed concerns of increasing drug activity and has proposed the establishment of a government of \’trust\’, which PM Rama strongly refutes.

The democrats, themselves under constant accusations of corruption when in power, have declared they will not enter elections with Rama as prime minister, and last night failed to register at the Central Elections Commission for participation at June\’s elections.

Apart from its dictator\’s death 32 years ago, April also counts several important constitutional dates which could determine Albania\’s future to the European Union.

The first deadline for political parties to register of election participation, run out last night with the opposition boycotting the process.

By April 19th pre-electoral coalitions have to be registered at the Central Elections Commission while by April 29th all party lists of candidates running for parliament have to be officially registered.

In addition, Albania has to vote on the names to perform its crucial \’Vetting\’ process as part of an historic justice reform approved last July, and has to kick of the start of the election of a new President for the country.

Albania\’s PM Edi Rama has said he will not resign while elections will go ahead as planned on June 18th, with or without the opposition. Rama has also accused the opposition democrats of boycotting parliament because they fear the justice reform which will get rid of may judges and prosecutors place in duty when the democrats and their former leader Sali Berisha were in power.

However, with the opposition democrats boycotting parliament, none of these processes can go forward.

Speaker of Parliament Ilir Meta has convened tonight an extraordinary plenary session in parliament which is expected to vote on the vetting process and hopes to be able to establish the parliamentary ad-hoc committee which will scan all proposed names for the vetting bodies.

The European Union has conditioned Albania\’s membership bid on the implementation of its justice reform.

However, the opposition has warned it intends to continue its boycott, which would make the establishment of the ad-hoc committee impossible, as equal representation is required from both majority and opposition.

Opposition leader Lulzim Basha repeated his calls for the prime minister to resign this morning.

\”Rama can come to our tent with his resignation and we will receive him peacefully. He can also come to the table as prime minister but will have to get out of talks as a resigned PM. We will go to the end of our battle for European standards which would guarantee once for all the free will of citizens at parliamentary and local elections,\” – said Basha this morning to his party\’s faithful in Tirana.

32 years after its dictator\’s death, Albania finds itself in a growing political deadlock, with the country\’s disillusioned youth wishing to leave for better lives in Europe, with a highly corrupt justice system which seems difficult to reform, high levels of corruption and organized crime and with opposition parties claiming the country\’s socialist government cannot guarantee free and fair democratic elections.

Meanwhile, the European Union and the United States, unable to influence events elsewhere in the region, find themselves puzzled by Albania\’s inability to move forward, and by a region which has traditionally been torn between East and West, between Europe, the US and Russia.

Copyright 2017 TiranaEcho.com All Rights Reserved

The post ANALYSIS – Albania\’s Democracy in Political Limbo on Dictator\’s Death Anniversary appeared first on BletaPunetore.al.

In itsSpecial Report, American Spctator says that developments in Macedonia present an opportunity for President Trump and Secretary Tillerson to pay some serious attention to the small Balkan country which is in a limbo.

Small but mighty Macedonia is the mouse that roared this year, declaring war on George Soros, 86, and his U.S. Government handmaidens, who, incredibly, have financed a left-wing agenda to divide the nation and bring a socialist-Muslim coalition to power.

It was the kind of Obama Administration manipulation that was so routine that it passed unnoticed in 2012, when USAID/Skopje selected Soros’ Foundation Open Society Macedonia (FOSM) to manage $2.5 million in taxpayer dollars earmarked for oxymoronic “democracy building,” an amount increased to $4.8 million two years later.

As we speak, and yes, I mean currently, Macedonia’s Open Society Foundation is a USAID partner recruiting candidates for “Youth Engagement Support (YES) grants” — concept papers were due five days after Donald J. Trump’s inauguration. It’s some part of a $9.5 million, five-year “civic engagement” boondoggle kicked off last year, which surely would be squelched if the Tillerson State Department were running on all cylinders.

Collusion between the Hungarian-American billionaire and the U.S. against Macedonia’s national interest is outlined on the website, StopSoros.mk, launched in late January by journalists in Skopje, the capital city and, incidentally, birthplace of Mother Teresa.

Over the last three weeks, inspired by the Trump Revolution, tens of thousands of Macedonians have held peaceful rallies for national unity, an end to chaos-creating Soros/USAID largess, and the removal of the U.S. Ambassador. One of the most common posters is a black and white, “No Soros Government.”

Macedonia’s plight has caught the attention of Capitol Hill: six Republican House members wrote to U.S. Ambassador Jess Baily on January 17, quizzing him about “disturbing reports” that the U.S. Mission “actively intervened” in domestic politics to promote “parties, media, and civil society groups of the center left.” They followed up with the Government Accountability Office, requesting an investigation. Last week, six Republican Senators directed a similar letter to Secretary of State Rex Tillerson.

Unfortunately, conservative Members of Parliament from Macedonia have trouble finding Administration interlocutors to listen to their complaints — though several have flown to D.C. over the last three weeks to brief anyone who will listen. (USAID, they consider an utterly lost cause.)

Paging Mr. Trump

“Soros was Clinton and Clinton was Soros in the Balkans,” explained an agitated Macedonian MP, member of the Christian democratic VMRO-DPMNE party (commonly known as VMRO, pronounced VOOM-row), cooling his heels last week in a Dupont Circle cafe.

“Soros was Obama and Obama was Soros,” added the MP, who asked not to be named.

He fanned a stack of papers on the table before me, eager to make two well-documented points: First, Macedonia, the only nation to escape Yugoslavia without war, has been led by VMRO’s pro-growth, low-tax, family-values government for the last 11 years.

Macedonia is currently ranked #10 in the World Bank’s “Ease of Doing Business” standings, higher than any other Central or Eastern European country — and just two places below the U.S. Five years ago, the Financial Times lauded VMRO for introducing a 10% flat tax on personal and corporate taxes, the lowest in Europe.

Besides being fiscally conservative, the nation of 2.1 million is socially conservative. Macedonia is the only European country where restrictions on abortion have tightened. Since 2013, a waiting period and personal counseling is required when a woman seeks abortion; the government runs a multimedia public service campaign, “Choose Life!”

“We became a Soros target because we’re a conservative nation,” the politician ruefully observed.

Wordy but historical, VMRO-DPMNE refers to the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (VMRO) an 1893 movement for autonomy within the Ottoman Empire, updated in 1990 as Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (DPMNE), when the center-right party was founded in newly independent Macedonia.

Second, the MP’s file demonstrates, rather than applauding Macedonia’s progress — or at least, leaving it alone — U.S.-funded programs have provoked Saul Alinsky-style violence and ethnic division, inspiring a political crisis since 2015 as well as the empowerment of VMRO’s only political rival, the Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM), a socialist party led by Zoran Zaev, who has close ties to the Soros network extending beyond his homeland.

“It’s still going on, despite the new Administration!” the clean-cut, 40-something, MP exclaimed, waving a copy of the Soros/USAID YES grants Request for Proposals in my face.

“Awaiting Hillary Clinton’s coronation, they extended this fusion between Soros and the U.S. Government through 2021!”

Inviting me to consider what it means to pour $6-$7 million, Soros’ estimated annual budget for Macedonia, into a country of some two million people, the distraught man attracted attention from neighboring tables when he bellowed, “They are destroying my country!”

Hoping my new friend was exaggerating, I contacted several smart, reasonable, conservative analysts in Macedonia and a few in the U.S. who travel there frequently. All agree: Not only has the U.S. played negative, counterproductive games in Macedonia, they report our foreign policy has destabilized the country and promoted Islamic extremism.

U.S. goals are so unsavory to the majority Orthodox population that many are beginning to look toward Russia as a more sympathetic — not to mention Christian — ally.

Non-Electoral Tactics for Gaining Power

A fascinating 1995 New Yorker article describes how, and why, Soros jumped into newly independent Macedonia with both feet.

Unconvinced by Bulgarians who say there’s no such thing as a Macedonian ethnic group (Macedonians and Bulgarians speak virtually the same language; Macedonia was controlled by Bulgaria intermittently from the tenth century until 1918) and resentful of the Greek government’s efforts to snuff out the tiny country over its name (Athens imagines Macedonia has territorial designs on its northern region, known as Macedonia), Soros was enamored with the country’s first post-Communist president, Kiro Gligorov, a top boss under Marshall Josip Broz Tito, who competently staked out the country’s independent course.

With a sizable Albanian minority of some 25% of the population (at least, that was the percentage in 2002 when the last census was taken), Soros considered Macedonia a valuable example of a viable multiethnic nation in a region where ethnicity has been Hellishly weaponized. The foundation’s early programs concentrated on inter-ethnic relations and media development, then broadened to include Soros passions such as LGBT activism and “sex worker” rights, minority views with little popular support in a country where the majority is quietly devoted to the Macedonian Orthodox Church, an unloved stepchild, still claimed by the Serbian Orthodox Church.

Soros’ preferred policies had zero traction as long as VMRO held power. Having controlled the unicameral legislative branch 1992-1998 and 2002-2006, the socialists lost consecutive parliamentary elections to VMRO in 2006 and 2008. It won seats in 2011 after provoking a parliamentary crisis that brought early elections. SDSM saw the advantage of using bullying tactics to gain power and turned to its friends in the burgeoning civil society world for a longer-term strategy.

As the New Yorker’s prescient reporter, Connie Bruck, observed over 20 years ago, “[T]he problem with Soros is the extremity of his views — his tendency to beatify one side and demonize the other — and the way in which that’s reflected in his activism.”

Macedonian Information Agency editor, Cvetin Chilimanov, age 38, watched as FOSM beatified SDSM and demonized VMRO.

“The Soros foundation has always been partisan but it became completely supportive of the Social Democrat party over the last four or five years,” Chilimanov explained. “Very openly, to the point that about 50 groups funded by Soros meet regularly with SDSM representatives; they call it a coalition between party and citizens, to organize joint protests, coordinate talking points, and coordinate joint positions of attack on the conservatives.”

“It’s been a five-year campaign to bring down the conservative government,” Chilimanov summarized, a timeline that coincides with USAID’s 2012 cooperative agreement with FOSM to foment “civic activism,” “fertilizing grassroots actions,” and “greater CSO [civil society organization] mobilization,” to use USAID’s somewhat ominous boilerplate.[10] To provide guidance, FOSM translated Saul Alinsky’s “Rules for Radicals,” a manual teaching social change through conflict, Chilimanov confirmed.

A 2014 FOSM internal document that surfaced via DCLeaks last year offers a small window on Soros entities as U.S. Government pick pockets: Metamorphosis, a foundation spun off by FOSM staff in 1999, and funded by the Soros Mother Ship, is listed as receiving funds from three USG funding streams, USAID, the U.S. Embassy, and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED).

What exactly does this group do? God only knows. Its website loftily reports, “Metamorphosis mission is to contribute to the development of democracy and increase the quality of life through innovative use and sharing of knowledge. Our guiding values are openness, equality and freedom.” So they do whatever they want with our money, and it must have been a success, since Metamorphosis is one of the four local groups, including FOSM, that received a $9.5 million earmark from USAID last year.

“Ten years ago, USAID was a normal organization supporting schools and water supply systems,” observed the MP visiting Washington, D.C. “Under Obama’s ideological programs, it became the super crack of the Left.”

It’s all a rich joke on the American taxpayer: as we transferred millions to Soros’ destructive projects abroad, he stiffed the U.S. Treasury: It was widely reported in 2015 that George Soros owed the Internal Revenue Service approximately $6.7 billion and there’s no evidence he ever settled the debt.

Judicial Watch submitted a Freedom of Information Act request to the State Department last month to scrutinize collusion between Soros, USAID, and the U.S. Embassy: The document lists 29 organizations, Soros clones, that have implemented Soros/USG strategy.

Politics of Mobilization

Not surprisingly, mobilization and protest became the opposition’s modus operandi in the spring of 2015, when Zoren Zaev, SDSM’s leader, produced phone recordings that allegedly revealed VMRO corruption — the governing party denied wrongdoing and called the tapes dubious. The well-trained activists came out to the streets.

Protests were replete with photogenic moments, designed to go viral, such as a seasoned NGO professional applying her lipstick, using a police shield as a mirror. Opposition claimed 100,000 demonstrators while state sources reported more like 10,000.

Meanwhile, in the midst of the wiretapping scandal came evidence that radical elements of the Albanian minority are a constant threat: extremists from neighboring Kosovo clashed with Macedonian security forces in a northern town, leaving eight officers and 14 civilians dead — the first fatalities due to ethnic violence in Macedonia in 14 years.

Last March, the Macedonian government boldly closed its border to prevent the tsunami of economic migrants and refugees surging from Greece toward Western Europe, allowing restricted numbers to enter. Open borders is one of George Soros’ most keenly felt priorities. How did his Team respond? Activism! With an admixture of violence and vandalism.

Ostensibly protesting pardons extended to 56 politicians by VMRO President Gjorge Ivanov, which he soon retracted, the socialist party and its well-trained “Soros Army” (as some professionally printed T-shirts actually declared) employed paint guns, slingshots with paint-filled balloons, and eggs to denigrate, albeit colorfully, public buildings and monuments.

The fertilized grassroots also broke into the president’s office, vandalized property, and burned office furniture. Three policemen were injured.

“I heard Soros and SDSM activists chanting, ‘No Justice, No Peace,’ which isn’t even a meaningful slogan in Skopje,” recalled Cvetin Chilimanov. “The transfer of tactics from U.S. Left-wing groups funded by Soros to Macedonia is striking.”

Simultaneously, the government had to defend its southern border with Greece, while diverting security forces 100 miles away from Skopje, to defend property against political agitators.

The traveling MP remembers, “It was a nightmare. The Soros army threw rocks at police guarding VMRO headquarters. Meanwhile, they were handing scissors out on the border to help people cut fences. Chaos.”

Information Service editor Chilimanov considers last summer’s melee to signal George Soros’ deepest objectives: “By controlling Macedonia, he can open or close the flow of migrants. The far Left Greek government has accepted no end of migrants. [Soros is close to the Greek Prime Minister, Alexis Tsipras.] It was our government that stopped the flow so his grand objective is to control this situation.”

External Intervention

In an excellent account of Macedonia’s political situation over the last two years, “Macedonia’s Crisis isn’t Going Away,” in this month’s issue of the American Interest, Chris Deliso, an American journalist and author who lives with his family in Skopje, writes, “Since 2015 in particular, active U.S. diplomacy has not only failed to resolve Macedonia’s political crisis, but it has in fact prolonged it, with every initiative (both covert and overt) having backfired in some way.”

Having helped position SDSM for a return to power, as a result of investments in its media and civil society infrastructure, the U.S. began shaping the process of creating the next government.

Deliso thinks the U.S. Government “could have just sat this one out.” In light of its extensive investments in the NGO superstructure, which is an investment in the SDSM party, there’s no way the State Department was going to stay on the sidelines.

Victoria Nuland, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, became prominently involved last summer in political negotiations toward parliamentary elections, ostensibly a neutral diplomatic role. She was clearly stirring the pot, though, announcing as she left in July, “Today, I met and talked with civil activists and journalists and encouraged them to continue with the work they are doing.”

Rescheduled from April to June to December, parliamentary elections were finally held on December 11, yielding a slight two-seat majority for VMRO over SDSM, 51-49. To form a governing majority 61 seats are necessary, so VMRO turned to its 2011-2016 partner, the Albanian Democratic Union for Integration (DUI), with ten seats. But DUI turned its back on its old VMRO ally, looking outside the country’s borders for guidance.

VMRO was to be frozen out of the election it had just narrowly won.

A new actor came onstage: Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama, leader of the Socialist Party of Albania — so close to George Soros, he attended the billionaire’s third wedding, in 2013. Rama and his Foreign Minister gathered Macedonia’s three largest Albanian political parties, which together have 18 seats, forging a new alliance, outlined in the so-called Tirana Platform. It’s a provocation from top to bottom, calling for Albanian as an official language at all levels of government (“full linguistic equality”), alluding to ethnic “nation building” as a legitimate goal, and calling for basic matters of national identity to be renegotiated including the country’s name, coat of arms, anthem, and flag.

SDSM leader Zoran Zaev adopted the Tirana Platform and obtained support — and 18 seats — from the three Albanian parties on February 25, declaring that he expected President Ivanov to give him the mandate that would make him Prime Minister. But on March 1, the president clapped back, denying Zaev a mandate because “his program advocates the destruction of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence.”[29]

Hence…daily rallies and organized strolls, around the country, featuring the signs of a lively, proud nation: Macedonia’s yellow sunburst on a red field, boys and girls in traditional costumes, a Robert Putnam-ian assortment of old-school NGOs such as handball leagues, dance troupes, and scouts.

Jason Miko, an American businessman who spends extensive time in Macedonia, highlighted that the Tirana Platform is “just an ethnic platform, with nothing about creating jobs” in a country where exclusive focus on ethnicity has led to war.

“This is what’s happening,” Miko said. “Low-level State Department bureaucrats are calling the shots because the President hasn’t been able to fill key jobs on the seventh floor. There is no oversight. They are telling the U.S. Ambassador to pressure Ivanov to give the mandate to Zaev.”

He continued, “In my opinion, this directly contradicts what President Trump said in his Inaugural address, that we want to let other nations put their own interests first. Instead, in Macedonia, we have an activist ambassador, Jess Baily, working with and funding the Soros organizations saying that no, you don’t have a right to put your own interests first.”

“What we really need from Washington is an adult in the Administration to stand up and say, ‘No, the Macedonians are going through their process, they know their constitution, and let the Macedonians take their process forward. That is what we really need from some senior official in Washington, DC.”

Since average people are shut out of process for now, they’ve displacing Soros activists in the street.

“What’s most important about these very calm gatherings is, they are regular people, from old to young,” observed Chris Deliso. “This is a simple, conservative society of people who know who they are. They don’t like to be looked down as second class Europeans.”

The author continued, “Something had to change and the Tirana Platform has galvanized people who were cynical until now about the value of their own preferences in their own country.”

Deliso says the political funding he has witnessed “just alienated one side of the country — the majority — and emboldened the other side to become more irresponsible. I’ve talked to people who work at USAID and always argued, either give equal funding to both sides or give no funding at all. Obviously, they haven’t listened.”

(Source: American Spectator series, “Soros in the Balkans Under the American Flag\”.)

Jeff Ooi/Creative Commons

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IN NORMAL times, the world tends to ignore Macedonia and its 2m people, a quarter of them ethnic Albanian. But the world is not ignoring Macedonia now. Western politicians are rushing to Skopje, Russia is issuing warnings and Serbian newspapers proclaim that war is coming. “Geopolitical relevance is returning to the Balkans,” laments Veton Latifi, an analyst.

The Macedonian crisis started with a coalition dispute. To preserve ethnic peace, governments consist of the winning Macedonian party and an Albanian one. Elections last December gave the incumbent Macedonian party, the nationalist VMRO, a slight edge. But after talks with the VMRO failed, the leading Albanian party, headed by Ali Ahmeti, opted for the Social Democrats. On March 1st Macedonia’s president refused to ask the Social Democrats to form a government, saying Albanian demands would “destroy” the country. The Social Democrats called it a “coup”.

Every weekday since, thousands of Macedonians have demonstrated in support of the president. The European Union’s foreign-policy chief, Federica Mogherini, along with the head of NATO and America’s State Department, have pleaded with him to reverse his decision. VMRO has staunchly supported joining NATO, but in this crisis it is backed by Russia.

At a deeper level, the conflict goes back to 2015, when the Social Democrats began releasing tapes of conversations (tapped by the intelligence services) which implicated Nikola Gruevski, the VMRO prime minister at the time, in corruption. Under EU auspices, a special prosecution office was set up, but VMRO now claims it is packed with Social Democrats. Lately VMRO supporters have accused George Soros, a philanthropist named in many potty conspiracy theories, of plotting against them. Ms Mogherini has been attacked in the press as a “fascistic Sorosoid bimbo”. American congressmen sympathetic to VMRO have attacked the American ambassador to Macedonia as a tool of Mr Soros.

At the centre of the crisis is Mr Ahmeti, a former guerrilla leader. Sharing power with Mr Gruevski since 2008 cost him support. He says Mr Gruevski would not agree to extend the mandate of the special prosecutor investigating him. Meanwhile, Albanian parties asked the government to keep its agreement to widen the use of Albanian as an official language.

According to Radmila Sekerinska, deputy head of the Social Democrats, Mr Gruevski instigated the crisis when he realised that he might lose power, which would leave him exposed to the special prosecutor investigating him. Not so, says Nikola Poposki, Macedonia’s foreign minister and a VMRO official. The Albanian language demand accepted by the Social Democrats “endangers the unity and sovereignty of Macedonia”, he says.

Mr Ahmeti warns against turning the crisis from a political one into an ethnic one, saying he has a tough job keeping his side’s own nationalist radicals in check. He disclaims any plans for a Greater Albania. Russia, he says, is stirring the Balkan pot; the best way out is to accelerate Macedonia’s accession to the EU and NATO. Good luck with that.

Source: The Economist

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From thousands of miles away, Chinese investment is helping modernize Albania, which is still many years behind its neighbors. Last March 2016, they became Albania\’s second-largest trading partner, leaving behind traditional trading partners like Greece and Turkey.

Within the top five trading partners, no one has accounted for export growth out of Albania like the Chinese, up over 6,000%. \”We have a long history together that really came out of forming an alternative to Soviet communist ideology. I think that history helped make the transition into the more economic, pragmatic relationship we have now,\” says the country\’s speaker of parliament, Ilir Meta. Meta has been speaker since 2013 and is from the Socialist Movement for Integration Party of Albania. He was in Washington recently for the inauguration of Donald Trump. \”China invests in Albania. We have a robust trading partnership with them now and it\’s beating our traditional partners in Europe.\” Meta said certain regulations also made it harder to close business deals with Europeans.

Meta was in Beijing in October signing deals with PowerChina, a construction conglomerate that has irrigation and other projects in Albania. In theory, when the Balkan countries along the Adriatic become members of the European Union and the euro-zone, assuming the euro survives 2017, the Chinese would have a foothold that rivals traditional neighbors.  The U.S., meanwhile, is trying to bring Albania up to snuff in terms of rules of law and government transparency. For Albania, the two are complimentary to its future.

So what is China doing in Albania exactly?

In March, Canada\’s Banker\’s Petroleum announced the sale of oil exploration and production rights to affiliates of China\’s Geo-Jade Petroleum for a price of 384.6 million euros. Banker’s started to exploit the Albanian oil fields of Patos-Marinze and Kucova in 2004, and since 2014 it has been the largest foreign company in the country. A month later, China Everbright and Friedmann PacificAsset Management announced the acquisition of Tirana International Airport in a 10 year concession deal. Though a second Albanian airport is scheduled to open for service soon, Tirana will remain the most important transport hub. It is one of the fastest-growing airports in Europe, with annual passenger rates rising from 600,000 in 2005 to two million in 2015. It\’s China\’s. 

Albania is also part of a pipeline project connecting Caspian Sea natural gas from Azerbaijan to Europe. The Trans-Adriatic Pipeline is supposed to bring in around 10 billion cubic meters of natural gas from Azerbaijan through a 211 kilometer pipeline in Albania where it will cross the Adriatic Sea to Italy. To get this done, a number of dirt roads need to be paved; bridges need to be modernized. So much of Albania\’s countryside has not changed since the days of communist rule.

\”Our goal is to be one of EU\’s energy hubs, really, and of course China knows this,\” says Meta who met with Azerbaijan parliamentary leader Ziyafet Asgarov recently to discuss TAP in Tirana. \”We\’ll be an integral part of this Trans-Adriatic Pipeline and get transit fees for that, which is good for the country. Good for the Balkans.\” The European leg of TAP is slated to be operational by 2020. The total investment in Albania by TAP is estimated to be 1.5 billion euros.

Transportation is improving in parts in Albania, thanks to Chinese money and the massive infrastructure demands required by TAP. But improvements are more stark in places because Albania, in many respects, is starting from zero. So in contrast, scores of European Union countries have not moved up the competitive rankings at score card enterprises like the Doing Business Report while Albania has.

(Government photo. Used by permission)

Albania\’s Speaker of the House of Parliament Ilir Meta (left) and Petrit Vasili, the country\’s Justice Minister, attend Trump\’s inaugural. (Photo provided by Albanian government press photographer. Used by permission.)

\”The entire region is in convergence with the E.U. now,\” say European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) analyst Peter Sanfay.

In general, the Balkans compare poorly with their E.U. neighbors on nearly every level. This is one of the main reasons behind the prosperity gap in the region, of which Albania is no stranger. Italy, right across the Adriatic, may as well be another world entirely.

The failure to make efficient use of talent, the reliance on informal networks rather than on professional management, the lack of business sophistication, and inadequate infrastructure are among the main problems facing Albania and the region, according to a white paper published online by EBRD. In other words, labor in Albania is cheaper than in the rest of Europe and even in China. Will low cost labor prove to be an asset in Albania’s development? Not unless the rule of law is taken seriously. Which is where Washington comes in.

Those who have met Meta say the country is moving in the right direction, and business leaders as well as political figures should \”respect the fact\” that it was only 25 years ago that Albania began moving away from its old totalitarian ways. “I think Meta is very practical and understands Albania’s history,” says Alan Bersin, the former head of Policy and International Affairs at the Department of Homeland Security under Obama.  “Meta knows the country’s transformation is going to take a generation, but he is one of the leaders of Albania who is the custodian of this transition from an economically backward and corrupt country to the Albania that mostly everybody wants – a vibrant economy, a democratic society and the rule of law,” Bersin says.

This Could Upend Progress…

Albania is not the country it was back in its Communist Party days. It\’s now known, unaffectionately perhaps, as the \”marijuana mecca\” of the Balkans. For the past two years, Albanian drug enforcement officers have been trying to eradicate drug trafficking. It\’s has arguably become one of Albania\’s worst public relations problems. The Chinese do not look at this challenge positively. They want no trouble for their investments.

Organized crime syndicates, allegedly with the support of some politicians, are believed to produce about 900 metric tons of cannabis a year, worth about 4.5 billion euros ($6.1 billion) – roughly half of Albania\’ s GDP.

Top officials have been accused of failing to do enough to stop Albania’s role in Europe’s drug trade. Some have even been accused of protecting—and even covering up for—those involved in it. So in December Albania released their new drug enforcement laws in hopes to accomplish two things: cut the drug dealers off at the pass, and make Albania safe for investment. The fight against drugs remains a key issue to Albania and one of the obstacles to obtaining EU membership. The new policy opens the door for security companies in particular, which is not a necessary forte of the Chinese. Despite the growth of hard drugs in the Balkans, Albania\’s main drug is marijuana and is the only illicit drug produced in Albania. Under the new rules, Albania\’s government said it will use aviation surveillance and invest in technical equipment to make monitoring such sites from a distance more feasible. According to the report, the key side effect Albania is hoping for is “to establish the rule of law,” of which will force some of the country\’s leaders to take corruption seriously.

Earlier this month, Albania’s drug drama placed the U.S. Embassy in Tirana at the center. Ambassador Donald Lu denied travel visas to 70 prosecutors, the Albania’s General Prosecutor’s Office said. In response, Prosecutor Adriatik Llalla, very publicly insisted that the decision was personal. Only members from one party were denied visas, which got the ruling Socialist Party to question why the State Department was pushing so hard and fast on criminal justice reform and singling out government officials from one group only.

Meanwhile Ambassador Lu said in local English language press reports that Speaker Meta was vital to the role of advancing the implementation of judicial reforms. \”Meta\’s role was critical in adoption of constitutional amendments in July 2016,\” he reportedly said. Lu\’s office did not return requests for comment made via the State Department in Washington regarding the visas. The State Department does not comment on why visas were denied.

Still, in the end, none of this geopolitical drama is making China a hard sell for the Albanians, who see Washington picking sides.

Outside of the complex political landscape and its myriad allegiances, Wall Street, meanwhile, just looks at Albania as another Balkan junk bond. Last year, JP Morgan and Bank of America went on an Albanian road show selling its frontier market B+ rated debt to institutional investors. They issued a $300 million bond. It was oversubscribed by around $150 million.

Going for yield is one thing; investing in Albania\’s physical economy is another. And that\’s where China clearly comes in. Foreign direct investment stock has reached nearly 50% of the country\’s GDP, mostly in the oil, metal ore, infrastructure, construction and telecom sectors. The Chinese think that the Balkans and other ex-communist countries outside of the European Union will play a role in its Silk Road project. It also gets money out of China, and develops markets for Made in China goods — whether its steel rebar or heavy machinery.

Wealthier Balkan nations are already in on the China act. Macedonia and Serbia are on this metaphorical Silk Road to Europe. Other countries are trying to reap the benefits of Chinese investment. Albania is one of them.

Arian Spasse, director of the Albanian ministry of foreign affair’s special department for relations with the European Union, said that even though Italy and Greece are his country\’s natural partners, the recent economic crisis forced Albania to look elsewhere. China comes with less red tape…and much less foreign intrigue. Albania\’s not complaining.

FocusEconomics expects the economy to grow 3.6% in 2017, up from 3.3% last year.

\”We are on the road to European integration,\” says Meta. \”Our only hope is that the E.U. investment here will improve. China sees us as an opportunity. We are happy to have them.”

Source: Forbes – By Kenneth Rapoza ,  Contributor
Opinions expressed by Forbes Contributors are their own.

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